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Abstract
In contrast to single-equation cross-sectional studies of private label share, developing a complete understanding of the
nature of the competitive interaction between national brands and private labels requires an understanding of the
determinants of both demand and strategic pricing decisions by firms. Consequently, we estimate a simultaneous system
of share and price for private labels and national brands. From the empirical results, two measures of market response are
derived. The unilateral demand elasticity measures the pure “own” demand response, while the residual (or “total”)
elasticity also captures the impact of competitive price reaction (Baker and Bresnahan 1985). When taken together, these
provide important strategic insights into the pricing interaction between national brands and private labels.
In our empirical analysis, we employ a flexible, non-linear demand specification, the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal
Demand System (LA/AIDS, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and specify the price reaction equations derived under the
LA/AIDS demand specification. Incorporating LA/AIDS demands into a structural equation framework represents an
important departure from previous demand specifications in competitive analysis. Using the proposed LA/AIDS
framework, we perform a detailed intra-category analysis using data on six individual categories: bread, milk, pasta,
instant coffee, butter and margarine. In addition, in an attempt to generalize the results to a broader set of categories and in
order to enable us to compare our results to previous cross-section studies, we also estimate using a sample pooled across
125 categories and 59 geographic markets.
Consistent with our objectives, we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and the factors
influencing firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Further, estimates
of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete
picture of the ability of brands to raise price. Managerial implications, limitations and suggestion for future research are
discussed.
Keywords: Competition; Competitive Strategy; Private Labels; PricingCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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1. Introduction
The nature of competitive interaction between
“national brand” and “private label” products has been a
primary concern of marketing managers in the food
industry for some time now. Over the past decade, this has
taken on greater urgency as private label products have
made substantial inroads in a number of product
categories. For example, in 1996, private label sales in
food stores increased 6.3% versus manufacturer brand
growth of just 1.3% (Progressive Grocer, November
1996). Overall, private label brands in U.S. supermarkets
reached an all-time high unit market share of 20.8% in the
third quarter of 1997 (BrandWeek, 11/24/97).
Alternatively, private label sales have declined in some
categories as national brands have effectively responded to
private label competition (BrandWeek, 5/29/95, New York
Times 6/11/96). Yet, despite the increasingly intense
competitive interaction between private labels and national
brands, surprisingly little research has been conducted
addressing this issue.
Most previous empirical research has focused on the
variation in market share of private label products across
categories (Sethuraman 1992; Sethuraman and
Mittelstaedt 1992; Hoch and Banerji 1993). Sethuraman
(1992), for example, identifies twelve marketplace factors
as potential determinants of private label success. These
factors include retail sales volume, average retail price,
price differential between the private label and national
brands, retail private label price promotion and brand
promotion. These cross-section approaches, however, have
produced some counter-intuitive findings. For example, a
consistent yet surprising finding is that there is a negative
relationship between national brand-store brand price
differential and store brand market share (McMaster 1987;
Raju and Dhar 1991; Sethuraman 1992). This implies that
the larger the price differential between national brands
and private labels, the lower the private label share. Raju,
Sethuraman and Dhar (1995a), suggesting that cross-
category analysis is inappropriate for assessing the true
relationship between private label share and price
differential, demonstrate that analysis of a single category
over time produces the expected positive relationship. We
show that the previous counter-intuitive results may also
be due to the failure of cross-sectional studies to address
the simultaneity of demand and competitive interaction
between market players.
While early work addressing private label-national
brand interaction used static structural measures of
competition (e.g., Connor and Peterson 1992), recent
research has begun to address the simultaneous estimation
of demand and competitive interaction for private label
products. For example, Kadiyali, Chintagunta and
Vilcassim (1998), using data on wholesale and retail
prices, investigate pricing power in manufacturer-retailer
interactions for a local analgesics market. Also, Putsis and
Dhar (1998a) describe the pattern of interaction that exists
between private labels and national brands across on 58
categories. Employing linear demands within a conjectural
variations framework, both papers suggest that a richer set
of questions can be addressed when demand and
competitive response are considered simultaneously.
We build on prior research on private labels in two
fundamental ways. First, we maintain that developing a
complete understanding of the interaction between private
labels and national brands requires an understanding of
the determinants of both demand and strategic pricing
decisions by firms. As an example, recent price cuts in the
ready-to-eat cereal category by Post and Nabisco in
response to pressure from private label resulted in a
consumer response that increased its market share from
about 16 percent to over 20 percent, while decreasing
private label shares. In response, Kellogg’s announced a
20 percent across the board price cut due to declining
shares of its major brands. Other national brand and
private label cereal manufacturers also reduced prices
(Cotterill and Franklin 1999). Clearly share responds to
price, while the price setting behavior of firms depends
upon the game being played by interdependent agents.
While this is certainly not new, we maintain that the
counter-intuitive findings inherent in much of the cross-
sectional research on private labels can easily be explained
by simultaneously addressing demand and price setting
behavior, even when conducting a cross-sectional
analysis.
1
Second, we analyze the strategic price interaction
between national brands and private labels, which enables
us to assess differences in the ability of national brands
and private labels to raise price across categories. Previous
examination of demand response has generally focused the
concept of partial own demand elasticity within a
Marshallian demand curve (see, e.g., Tellis’ 1988 Meta
analysis). This measure of price response has often been
criticized for its ceteris paribus assumption, explicitly
                                               
1.  It is well known that OLS applied equation by equation to
jointly endogenous variables (e.g., price as a function of share
and share a function of price as explained above) will produce
inconsistent parameter estimates (see, e.g., Intriligator 1978 or
Judge, 1985).  Simultaneous equation approaches to estimation
have a long history in marketing (Bass 1969; Schultz 1971;
Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 1990; Neslin 1990; Bayus and
Putsis 1999).Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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assuming all other prices are held constant (see, e.g.,
Werden 1998). In reality, most price changes are met with
some sort of competitive response (see, e.g., Leeflang and
Wittink 1992). Since a firm’s price change is likely to be
met by a change in the prices charged by its rivals, the
observed demand effect will be attenuated or exaggerated
by the competitive response and related cross-price
demand response. Accordingly, estimates of partial
demand elasticities alone may provide managers with
inadequate information regarding the impact of a given
price change. Consequently, in the empirical analysis
below, we examine the total (or “residual”) demand
elasticity. The residual demand elasticity measures the net
demand response once competitor reactions and cross-
price demand effects are taken into account. Consequently,
it not only can be an important part of understanding the
pricing relationship between private labels and national
brands, but can also be a useful managerial tool for
assessing the net impact of a price change (see, e.g., Baker
and Bresnahan 1985, Cotterill 1994).
2
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we
describe the theoretical model that guides the empirical
specification and the selection of variables. Using
LA/AIDS demands, we assume that retailers engage in
proportionate mark-up behavior within the channel.
Consequently, before we present the results, we provide a
test of this assumption and demonstrate that it is indeed
supported empirically in the categories studied here. We
then describe the methodology used in the empirical
analysis in some detail.  In discussing the results, we first
present estimates of model parameters for the LA/AIDS
framework applied to a large cross-category panel data set
that includes 125 categories in 59 local markets. We then
present the results obtained by applying the proposed
framework to six individual categories. Consistent with the
objectives stated above, we find that a) the counter-
intuitive pricing findings of previous cross section analysis
disappear once we account for the simultaneity of demand
and supply, and b) there are important differences in the
pricing power of private labels across categories implied
by residual demand elasticities versus the more commonly
                                               
2. Following Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and Cotterill (1994),
and using a duopoly for illustration, the residual or total demand
elasticity is defined follows: h1
R = h11 + h12 x21, where h11
denotes the (own) “partial” demand elasticity, h12 denotes the
cross-price demand elasticity of demand (both estimated directly
from the demand equation), and x21 denotes the price reaction
elasticity (estimated directly from the reaction functions). We
will use the terms residual demand elasticity (Baker and
Bresnahan 1985, Werden 1998) and total demand elasticity
(Tomek and Robinson 1981) interchangeably throughout.
used partial own demand elasticity. We conclude with a
discussion of the study’s limitations and suggestions for
future research.
2. Theoretical Framework
Several approaches to estimating competitive
interaction have been suggested in the literature. One
approach to estimating competitive interaction requires
specifying, a priori, the various forms of competitive
interaction to be considered (hence it is often referred to as
a “menu” approach). Non-nested hypothesis tests are used
to ascertain which type of competition best fits the data
(see, e.g., Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong 1992, and Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1996). Alternatively,
conjectural variations (CV) approaches allow a researcher
to estimate the competitive interaction directly without the
need to specify the interactions a priori (see, e.g., Putsis
and Dhar 1998a, 1998b and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta 1998). This entails deriving each player’s
first order conditions as a function of the conjectures each
player has about its rival’s actions; these first order
conditions and the demand functions are estimated
directly. Alternatively, the reaction function approach that
we present here contrasts with the CV approach in that it
solves the first order conditions for each player, expressing
each decision variable as a function of rival’s decision
variables, as well as demand and cost shift variables (see,
e.g., Martin 1993). This provides a researcher with a
functional form specification based upon each player’s
“best response” given the underlying demand structure and
competitive environment. As pointed out by Liang (1987)
and Tirole (1988), the reaction coefficients are generally a
complex function of the demand coefficients and the
conjectures.
3
Following work by Choi (1991) and Besanko, Gupta
and Jain (1998), we begin with a category-level model of
manufacturers operating in a duopoly, with one producing
a national “branded” product and the other producing a
                                               
3. We note that for consistent conjecture models, the CV and
reaction function approaches produce identical estimates of
competitive interaction. If a model is a consistent conjecture
model, then firm one’s (two’s) conjecture about changes in P
2
(P
1) when it changes P
1 (P
2) would be equal to the observed




2). See Putsis and Dhar (1998a)
for a discussion of the various approaches taken for estimating
competitive interaction and Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim
(1998) or Bresnahan (1989) for a discussion of the interpretation
of CV parameters.Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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3.2 Empirical Specification
  We define the set of variables used in the empirical
analysis to follow directly from the theoretical model
above (Chart 1 lists the variables used in the empirical
analysis). Based upon previous research, we specify the
demand shift vector, Dij, to include three sets of variables:
i) variables capturing retail promotion activity, ii) local
market characteristics, and iii) private label distribution.
Let us address each set of variables one at a time. First,
similar to Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (1998), we
specify a series of endogenous trade promotion variables
in the demand shift vector. These variables include
measures of the percent of volume sold on display, the
percent of volume sold with a local newspaper feature
advertisement, and temporary percent price reduction
(BRDISPLAY, BRPRICEREDN and PLPRICEREDN).
8
Second, following Hoch, et al. (1995), who found that
local market characteristics affect the observed demand
response, we also include two variables representing
PLDISPLAY, BRFEATURE, PLFEATURE,  local market
demographics (INCOME, AGE). Third, since the total
demand for private labels and  national brands in a
geographic area will clearly be affected by private label
coverage, we also include private label distribution
(PLDISTN) as a demand shift variable. All of this implies:
                                                                                 
all private labels (national brands) in the ith market, jth category.
 The two price reduction variables are volume-weighted percent
price reduction for all private label and branded products,
respectively.  Thus, for price and share, we have four aggregate
variables: total branded share, total private label share, volume-
weighted average price of national brands, and the volume-
weighted average price of private label products.
8. We address the endogeneity of the trade promotion variables
through the use of instrumental variables. The principle is
similar to the approach taken by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995).  Specifically, each promotional vehicle for market i,
category j, is expressed as a function of the promotional activity
in each of the other j (j „ i) markets, using the fitted value as the
instrument. Note that in order for this approach to eliminate the
endogeneity bias, the equation errors for each promotion
instrument have to be independent. This requires that display
and feature decisions, for example, are made on a market by
market (or chain by chain) basis.
  Similarly, on the supply side, the brand level Herfindahl is
specified as endogenous, following the methodology suggested
by Nevo (1998). Specifically, an instrument is created by
forming a weighted average of previous period Herfindahl
indices (the weights created by time series regressions). This
created an instrument correlated with the current period
Herfindahl at over 90%, but which is predetermined in the
current period.
Dij ” {(BRFEATURE, PLFEATURE, BRDISPLAY,
PLDISPLAY, BRPRICEREDN, BRPRICEREDN);
(INCOME, AGE); PLDISTN}.
On the supply-side, since we don’t observe costs
directly, we include cost-shift variables or retailers and
manufacturers, respectively. First, prior empirical work on
the concentration-price relationship in grocery retailing
suggests that the general level of the markup in a local area
is related to local retailer concentration (Marion 1979,
Cotterill 1986). Consequently, we postulate that the retail
mark-ups (m
1 and m
2) should be influenced by the local
retailer’s ability to raise price over (wholesale) cost and,
accordingly, specify m
1 and m
2 to be a function of local
retail concentration (GROCCR4). Second, we note that
Putsis (1997) finds a negative relationship between the
brand-level Herfindahl and price. The conclusion drawn
there was that the negative relationship was caused
primarily by the increased costs associated with a more
disperse and fragmented product line, suggesting that
manufacturer pricing decisions may be related to brand-
level dispersion for cost-related reasons. Finally, we proxy
for manufacturer costs by including a measure of package
size to capture the hypothesis that smaller package sizes
have higher costs per unit. This discussion implies that C
1
ij
” {BRVOLPUN, GROCCR4, HERFINDAHL}, and C
2
ij ”
{PLVOLPUN, GROCCR4, HERFINDAHL}. The
Appendix summarizes the predicted signs and presents a
more detailed rationale for selected key variables used in
the empirical analysis. 
3.3 Methodology




ij as defined above
into the LA/AIDS system (equations 1, 2 and 3), we
estimated the system directly using three stage least
squares. Note that although our model has four equations,
however, one of the demand equations is redundant for
estimation purposes. Since the market shares of national
brands and private labels sum to one, any loss of branded
share due to changes in any variable, e.g. private label
price, must go to private label share.  This general adding
up property of a demand system means that we can recover
the estimated coefficients and standard errors (t-ratios) for
the dropped equation. We drop the private label demand
equation and estimate the remaining three equations with
three stage least squares.
We began by estimating the LA/AIDS system using a
sample pooled across the 125 categories. Conducting the
analysis on the pooled data enabled us to carefully
examine some of the counter-intuitive pricing results found
in previous cross-category research on private labels (e.g.,
Sethuraman 1992). It is important to note that cross-Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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category analysis of this type precludes the use of price
levels: one cannot compare the price of a pound of cheese
to the price of canned soup. Thus, it would be
inappropriate to conduct a cross-category analysis
focusing on price relationships using data across multiple
categories for a given time period (see, e.g., Kelton and
Weiss 1989). Consequently, following Kelton and Weiss
(1989), we estimated a first difference form on the pooled
annual data from 1991 and 1992.
9  Note that when
conducting a cross-category study, estimating a first
difference model is particularly attractive because it
controls for first order fixed effects due to excluded local
market and category variables in level regressions.
10
Further, to the extent that product quality is constant from
one period to the next, estimating a first difference model
eliminates the need for the inclusion of a quality measure
for each category since (an assumed constant level of)
quality drops out of the analysis when we difference. This
is particularly important since quality measurement is such
a difficult task when conducting a cross-category analysis
(see, e.g., Hoch and Banerji 1993 and Narasimhan and
Wilcox 1998).
The focus of our empirical analysis, however, is on
intra-category analysis. Consequently, we also estimated
the proposed LA/AIDS framework using data for six
individual categories: milk, butter, bread, pasta, margarine,
and instant coffee. We use these individual category results
below to examine the interaction between private labels
and national brands in detail on a category-by-category
basis. Since individual category-level analysis does not
suffer from the same apples-to-oranges comparison that
cross-category analysis does, we were able to use the
“level” data for each individual category over the 1991 to
1992 time period without needing to take the first
difference.
  
                                               
9. 
 For example, in the first difference equations, BRSHARE is
1992 BRSHARE minus 1991 BRSHARE and BRPRICE is the
1992 LN(BRPRICE) minus the 1991 LN(BRPRICE). Changes
in the natural logarithm of price from 1991 to 1992 are percent
price changes that can be analyzed across categories. The
interpretation of the coefficients in these “differenced” equations
is identical to those in the “level” equations.
10.  Hausman and Taylor (1981) argue that excluded local
market variables in panel data of this type can bias estimation
results for level regressions.  They show that this can be avoided
by specifying a set of city binary variables.  These drop out of the
model when one takes the first difference.  This is also true for
specifying a set of category binary variables in level regressions
to control for excluded variables in individual categories.
3.4 Examination of Model Assumptions
Modeling the interaction between national brands and
private labels is especially challenging because the vertical
relationship between manufacturers and retailers plays a
particularly important role in retail pricing behavior. As a
result, one needs to be concerned about the vertical as well
as horizontal nature of competitive interaction. In the
formulation above, we made two fundamental
assumptions: 1) retailers follow a proportional mark-up
rule within the channel, and 2) LA/AIDS demands. Given
the significance of vertical channel relationships for
private label products, it is important that we demonstrate
that these assumptions appropriately characterize market
behavior before we proceed with estimation.
Consequently, in this section, we discuss the results of
empirical tests of these assumptions.
In related work (Cotterill and Putsis 1998), we
develop tests of channel behavior based upon two well-
cited theoretical models of channel structure, Choi’s
(1991) Manufacturer Stackelberg model and the Raju, et
al. (1995b) model of private label—national brand
interaction. Specifically, we first demonstrate that both
models can be represented as specific cases of a more
general class of mark-up models. This enables us to derive
a set of nested tests for the use of proportional markup
behavior within the channel. In the current setting, out of
12 tests for proportional markup conduct (six for private
labels and six for national brands), all but one were
consistent with proportional markup behavior (all tests are
at p < .01). Thus, these results are consistent with the
supply-side assumptions made in the Raju, et al. (1995b)
model and provide support for the assumption made in the
derivation of the LA/AIDS reaction functions above.
In addition, we examine our assumption of LA/AIDS
demands. Specifically, since previous research has
generally employed a linear functional form, we compare
the LA/AIDS specification to a linear form using a non-
nested P-E test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1981).
Balasubramanian and Jain (1994) suggest that the choice
of non-nested test should be guided by the circumstances
surrounding the test (see, e.g., their Table 7 for the
appropriateness of using the P-E test in the current
application). Jain and Vilcassim (1989) demonstrate that
the sample size requirements for the P-E test may be less
stringent than that required for Lagrange multiplier tests,
suggesting that that it is particularly relevant in our
application. We employ it as detailed in Greene (1997, pp.
459-462). The results for the demand specification were
even more conclusive than those for within-channel
structure discussed above. For all six categories, the P-E
test strongly rejected the null of a linear model at p <<Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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.0001 (except for the bread category, where we reject the
linear specification at p < .01). Since each of these tests
offers support for the three assumptions made in the





The results are presented in two stages. First, in this
section, we describe the cross category results as well as
those for the six individual categories to provide an overall
sense of what the analysis reveals. Second, in the following
section (Section 5), we discuss the results in relation to the
paper’s two contributions proposed earlier (simultaneity
and pricing interaction).
4.1 Cross-Category (Pooled) Results.
   Although the focus of our research is on the intra-
category analysis, we begin by presenting the pooled
cross-category results in an attempt to provide an overview
of the findings, as well as a link to previous cross-sectional
research on private labels. Tables 1 and 2 present the
results using the sample pooled across all 125 categories.
Table 1 presents the full set of parameter estimates, while
Table 2 presents the associated demand elasticities. We
note that all of the coefficients have the hypothesized signs
and are statistically significant.
   There are two specific results from the cross-category
analysis that should be addressed before we proceed to the
intra-category analysis. First, in the price reaction
equations, we find that the four-firm retail concentration
has a significant and positive impact on both branded and
private labels prices. The coefficient is 50 percent higher
for private label products (.057 versus .028 for national
brands), suggesting that the price differential between
private labels and national brands narrows in more locally
concentrated grocery markets. This is consistent with prior
work on the relationship between concentration and price
in grocery retailing (Marion 1979, Cotterill 1986), but it
represents a significant advance due to the much larger
number of categories and markets studied here.
Second, we note that both demand and competitive
price response may be related to the existing private label
                                               
11. Thanks to the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-
ran each specification using two additional randomly selected
categories (mustard and brownie mixes). We again reject linear
demands (p << .0001), while the tests for channel behavior
support proportional mark-up for both private labels and
national brands (again p < .01). Substantively, the estimated
demand elasticities and reaction elasticities were in the range
reported in the text for the other categories. 
share in the category. For example, we would expect the
national brand price reaction to be greater in categories
where private label share was higher, reflecting the greater
threat posed by private labels in these categories. In an
initial attempt to investigate the impact of varying share
levels, we divided the sample into quartiles based upon
private label share.
12 Table 3 presents the estimated
demand and price reaction elasticities across these
quartiles. While there is little change in the own demand
response across quartiles, this is not true of cross-price
demand response. Whereas national brand demand is more
sensitive to changes in private label price in high private
label share categories, private label demand is less
sensitive to national brand price. Consistent with this
observation, national brand price reaction elasticities also
increase across quartiles (in the high quartile in particular),
presumably reflecting heightened national brand attention
to the increased private label presence. In general, it
appears as though price is not an important strategic
weapon when private label share is low, but becomes
increasingly important in categories where private label
share is high. While this may be due in part to a higher
degree of price leadership exhibited by private labels in
high share categories, it may also be reflective of the
idiosyncratic nature of the individual categories. This also
highlights the importance of intra-category analysis, to
which we now turn.
 
4.2 Intra-Category Results.
Table 4 presents the estimated demand and price
reaction elasticities using the data for the six individual
categories. Since traditional R
2 measures are not bounded
between zero and one in three stage least squares, Carter
and Nagar’s (1977) multiple squared coefficient of
correlation for simultaneous systems, Rw
2, was used. All
systems fit well, with the system-wide Rw
2 values ranging
from a low of 0.932 for bread to a high of 0.998 for instant
coffee and margarine.
13
                                               
12.  Since share is the dependent measure on the demand-side, it
is not possible to include share in the price reaction equation.
Thus, quartile stratification represents a direct and parsimonious
mechanism for addressing the impact of changing share on the
parameter estimates. An advantage of the stratification is that it
enables us to allow all parameter estimates to vary across the
strata. Most parameter estimates were stable across the quartiles.
13.  Rw
2 has a usual R
2 interpretation.  Specifically, it measures
the percent of system-wide variation in the endogenous variables
explained by all independent variables in the system.  It is
bounded by zero and one. However, we note that this statistic is
frequently very high and should be interpreted with caution (seeCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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For the individual categories represented in Table 4,
the empirical estimation produced results with not only a
great deal of face validity, but also results that were
consistent with previous research on a number of
dimensions. For example, the estimated own price demand
elasticities for national brands ranged from -1.03 for
instant coffee to -2.05 in the milk category. Tellis (1988)
in a meta-analysis of reported demand elasticities, found
the mean price elasticity of demand to be equal to -1.71.
Further, price response is asymmetric–national brand price
cuts are generally more effective in stealing share from
private labels (consistent with Allenby and Rossi 1991 and
Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989). However, this
asymmetry is reversed in the butter category (a category
with high private label share at 46%). Bronnenberg and
Wathieu (1996) suggest that reversals may occur in
categories where private labels have advantageous
positions in terms of quality relative to price (also see
Hardie, Johnson and Fader 1993).
With respect to the price reaction elasticities, the price
reactions of national brands were generally small in
magnitude and very close to those reported previously in
related research (Lambin 1976, Hanssens, Parsons and
Schultz 1990, pp. 201-210). In each of the price reaction
equations, own feature and display have strong negative
estimated coefficients for both private labels and national
brands. It appears as though when price cuts occur, feature
advertising and point of sale displays occur more
frequently, advertising the price cuts (Mayhew and Winer
1992). However, when national brand display and feature
ads are active, private label prices are lower. This suggests
to us that retailers often respond with price as a strategic
weapon in categories where national brand display and
feature advertisements are used extensively. This is
consistent with recent experience in the breakfast cereal
industry (Gejdenson and Schumer 1995, 1996; Angrisani,
1996; Cotterill 1999).
Some additional insight can be gained by looking at
individual categories in some depth. For example, private
labels competing in the pasta category face consumers who
are particularly price sensitive. Both national brand and
private label demands are elastic, with estimated demand
elasticities of -1.46 and -3.66, respectively. The price
differential between national brands (with an average price
of 99 cents) and private labels (68 cents) is substantial.
Cross-price response is decidedly asymmetric—a 1%
change in private label price generates only a 0.42%
change in national brand demand, while a 1% change in
                                                                                 
Berndt 1991, p.468). Further, collinearity may inflate the
estimates of Rw
2 throughout.
national brand generates a 2.9% change in private label
demand. National brands, with .81 share, have a dominant
market position and compete mildly aggressively on price
(the national brand price response elasticity is equal to
0.52). However, consistent with the pooled results, this
dominant position erodes in more concentrated retail
environments. Contrasting with the pasta category,
national brands in the margarine category not only possess
a dominant position in terms of share (private label share
is just .16), but compete vigorously on price. While the
national brand demand elasticity is mildly elastic (-1.39),
private label demands are highly price sensitive (with an
estimated elasticity of -6.38). Here, however, unlike the
pasta category, national brands react strongly to private
label price cuts—a 1% reduction in the price of private
labels is estimated to produce a 1.5% reduction in national
brand price. Such a strategy by national brands is likely to
be effective—a 1% reduction in national brand price
produces an estimated 3.96% reduction in private label
demand. Further, the dominant position enjoyed by
national brands in this category is not likely to be offset by
increases in local retailer concentration (national brand and
private label prices increase by approximately the same
amount when local retail concentration increases). As a
result, private label brands have a particularly difficult
time competing through price even when the local market
is characterized by strong local retailers. It appears as
though national brands use a dominant market position
effectively by using price as a strategic weapon in this
category.
This discussion suggests that price interaction between
national brands and private labels occurs at multiple levels
–not only do we need to properly assess the direction of
demand and supply reactions, but we also need to be able
to understand and assess the nature of the interaction
observed. To this we now turn.
5. Discussion – Substantive Findings
5.1 Previous Cross Section Studies
We noted earlier that previous cross-sectional research
(e.g., McMaster 1987; Raju and Dhar 1991; Sethuraman
1992) has, surprisingly, found a negative relationship
between national brand-private label price differential and
private label market share. This suggests that as private
label price increases, its share also increases. Raju,
Sethuraman and Dhar (1995a) suggested that while such a
relationship may be true in cross-section, it is unlikely to
hold in time series. In our analysis, we find that the own-
price demand elasticities in Table 2 (pooled results) and
Table 4 (intra-category results) are all negative asCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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predicted by theory. Also as expected, all of the price
reaction elasticities on the supply side are positive. It is
particularly important to note that the pooled analysis is
conducted across 125 categories. Thus, we are able to
obtain the expected negative demand-side price
coefficients and positive supply-side coefficients even in a
cross-sectional analysis.
14 In short, there are no free
lunches–a ceteris paribus price increase results in a loss in
share.
5.2  Implications for Horizontal Pricing Relationships
As stated earlier, the use of partial own demand
elasticity to understand market response has often been
criticized for its ceteris paribus assumption, explicitly
assuming all other prices are held constant (see, e.g.,
Werden 1998). The previous discussion on price
interaction in the margarine category highlights the
importance of examining residual demand elasticities for
understanding strategic behavior. To illustrate, note that
while examination of the private label’s own price
elasticity of demand in this category (-6.38) alone would
suggest that lowering private label price is likely to be an
effective way to increase demand, this is simply not the
case. As noted above, a 1% reduction in private label price
generates a 1.5% change in national brand price, which, in
turn, reduces private label demand by 5.9% (1.5 times the
cross-price response of 3.96). Thus, the net effect of any
private label price decrease is likely to be relatively small
due to national brand competitive conduct in this category.
Following Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and Cotterill
(1994), it is possible to derive two measures of the impact
of a price change that provide substantive insights into the
ability of a firm to raise price vis-à-vis its competition.
The first, h11, is the familiar partial own demand elasticity,
which can also be thought of as the unilateral (or “non-
followship”) demand elasticity since it quantifies the
impact of a price change on demand when no rivals follow.
As such, it provides a measure of unilateral market power
–if national brands raised price (without an associated
private label price change) and demand fell precipitously,
this would suggest that national brands have little ability to
raise prices unilaterally. The second measure is the
residual or total demand elasticity. This provides an
                                               
14. We note that these results (unlike those discussed in sub-
sections (b) and (c) below) are not driven by the demand
specification. The correct sign on the price variables on the
demand and supply sides are obtained using a linear demand as
well. Thus, simultaneity, not demand functional form, is the key
to empirically obtaining the proper signs on the price variable in
cross-section.
estimate of the total impact of a price change given actual
market behavior. Focusing on national brands as an
example, taking the derivative of the demand equation
with respect to price and using the chain rule to take into
account strategic interdependence, we can (with some
algebraic manipulation) derive the residual (or total)
demand elasticity for national brands, h1
R  =  h11 + h12 x21.
Here, h12 denotes the cross-price elasticity of demand
(estimated directly from the demand equation), and x21
denotes the price reaction elasticity (estimated directly
from the reaction functions).
15 Thus, the second term of
this expression (h12 x21) provides a measure of the
secondary effect of a price change on demand (due to
competitive response). If private label prices follow
national price changes in a coordinated fashion, x21 is
positive. Since national brands and private labels are
substitutes (h12 > 0), to the extent that coordinated pricing
behavior exists, this implies that the total elasticity will be
less elastic than the unilateral own price elasticity.
We use the estimates of own-price and cross price
demand elasticities, as well as the price reaction elasticities
presented above, to provide estimates of the total (h11 +
h12 x21) and unilateral (h11) demand elasticities. Table 5
presents estimates for national brands and private labels
across the six categories studied.   
The results in Table 5 suggest that there is a substantial
variation in the difference between residual and unilateral
demand elasticities across categories. In general, the residual
elasticity is lower (in absolute value) than the unilateral
elasticity, as expected. In the butter category for example,
an elastic unilateral demand elasticity (-1.50) for national
brands translates into a mildly inelastic residual elasticity
(-0.971). In this instance, this is due in large part to the
fact that national brand demand is sensitive to private label
pricing (the national brand cross-price elasticity equals
1.07). For some categories, the difference is more
dramatic. For example, in the margarine category
discussed above, the unilateral elasticity (-6.38) implies a
considerably larger price response than suggested by the
residual elasticity (-0.438). Despite the large own price
elasticity for private labels, a 1% price cut by private
labels will generate only a 0.437% net change in private
label demand. Thus, the viability of any private label
strategy aimed at altering price in this category should not
be nearly as effective as the unilateral elasticity implies.
Similar results are obtained for national brands in this
category, although the difference is not nearly as dramatic.
Finally, we note that for a number of categories (milk,
                                               
15. For private labels, the analogous expression is h2
R = h22 +
h21 x12.Competitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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bread and instant coffee), the national brand unitary and
residual elasticities are essentially identical. This is due
primarily to the fact that national brand demand in each of
these categories is not sensitive to private label price.
Thus, any competitive (price) response by private labels
will have little impact on national brand demand. The same
cannot be said for private labels in these categories–
private label demand is sensitive to changes in national
brand pricing behavior. Thus, while examination of
unilateral demand elasticities is likely to overstate demand
response in general, this is particularly true for private
label products.
5.3 Methodological Issues
The LA/AIDS framework introduced above provides
us with a flexible functional form that performs well on
both individual categories and on a larger pooled sample.
In addition, the structural equation system provides
reasonable fits and parameter estimates for all six
categories. Further, the PIGLOG (Price Independent
Generalized LOGarithmic) form of the LA/AIDS model
allows estimation at various levels of aggregation,
minimizing the assumptions necessary to avoid linear
aggregation bias (Christen, Gupta, Porter, Staelin and
Wittink 1997).  Specifically, it is easy to demonstrate that
any bias in marketing mix response estimates can be
eliminated by taking the first difference, provided that
relative store prices remain the same from one period to
the next.
16 
Nonetheless, one needs to be pragmatic about the
objectives at hand. The benefits of flexible non-linear
forms, such as the LA/AIDS specification, often come at a
cost such as analytical intractability. In evaluating the
appropriate demand form to use, each of the various
tradeoffs should be considered.
Finally, variation from category to category in each of
the parameter estimates suggests that while a pooled
                                               
16. This can be shown quite easily. Under a first difference
model, all variables are expressed as the change from period t to
t+1.  Since the marketing mix response in a LA/AIDS
specification of our model is log-log in share, first differencing
expresses prices, for example, as the log of the ratio of prices in t
and t-1.  As long as the relative prices move together, the ratio
of the prices is constant.  Thus, if the percent change in prices is
the same from store to store, the bias is eliminated (this is
analogous to homogeneous marketing mix variables in the
Christen, et al. 1996 paper).  Thus, it is not necessary that all
consumers at all stores face the same prices. We would argue
that assuming that the relative prices remain the same from one
period to the next is much more tenable than assuming that all
stores have the same prices.
analysis might provide estimates of the demand and
reaction elasticities that are correct on average, they are
likely to provide inaccurate estimates of the response for
any specific category.  Although a pooled analysis
provides some level of generalizability, the parameter
estimates should be viewed as precisely that - general
results that may not hold for specific categories. Detailed
information on the interaction that occurs for any specific
category requires intra-category analysis (Bresnahan
1989).
  
6. Conclusion-Discussion, Limitations and Future
Research
Analysis of the IRI data studied here combined with
consideration of both demand and supply side influences
provide considerably more insight into competitive
strategies than do single-equation cross sectional studies.
In order to get a more complete view of the strategic
implications and in an attempt to produce generalizable
results, we have conducted our empirical analysis across a
variety of categories and geographic markets.
Based upon the discussion above, there are two main
substantive implications:
• Simultaneity. Brand managers should expect to face
traditional demand relationships regardless of whether
they are managing a national brand or a private label -
an increase in the price of a national brand (private
label) lowers national brand (private label) share. 
There are no free lunches here - a higher price means a
lower share.
• Horizontal Relationships. Estimates of residual
demand elasticities provide important insights into the
marginal impact of pricing decisions. For example, an
examination of residual demand elasticities suggests
that private labels generally have a more difficult time
competing on price than would be implied by
unilateral demand elasticities alone. In particular,
private labels have an especially difficult time in
markets where national brands respond aggressively
on price.
More generally, we also find that:
• Both demand and supply-side reactions vary by
category. This highlights the importance of
understanding the category-specific nature of
competition and demand response.  Research limitedCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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to one or two categories may not produce sufficient
generalizability.
• National brand private label price differential is lower
when local retail concentration is high, suggesting
that local retail concentration can afford retailers
some degree of market power. This may enable
retailers with a dominant position in the local market
to offset some of the horizontal power afforded
national brands.
• Cross price elasticities are decidedly asymmetric with
national brand price having a major impact on private
label sales, whereas private label price has a
considerably smaller impact on branded sales. This is
consistent with the work on asymmetric competition
and price tiers (Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989;
Allenby and Rossi 1991). However, these
asymmetries can be reversed (e.g., the bread
category), consistent with recent work by
Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996).
• Managers responsible for private labels operating in
markets with higher per capita income or categories
with a higher level of expenditure will have a more
difficult time penetrating the market. More generally,
we would expect private labels to suffer during
stronger economic times.
   
The strategic implications for private label brands are
numerous. For example, on the demand side (see Table 1),
income has the hypothesized impact on both national
brand (positive) and private label (negative) share. Further,
in terms of price, increases in income benefits national
brands most (the coefficient on income is positive and
significant in both price reaction equations, but the impact
on national brand price is almost twice as large as the
impact on private label price). Thus, higher income
markets imply a higher national brand share and a larger
price premium paid for national brands. While not
surprising, this does suggest clearly that higher income
markets and stronger economic times represent difficult
terrain for private label products. Price is an often used,
but not generally effective, tool for private label managers
attempting to steal share from national brands in these
circumstances.
The results presented above suggest that the
effectiveness of any pricing strategy should be viewed
within the context of both the residual and unilateral
demand elasticities. For example, while traditional
(unilateral) measures of demand response for private label
products in the margarine category would suggest that
aggressive pricing for private label products would be a
successful way to gain share, this would not be the case in
practice. Given the aggressive pricing by national brands
in this category and the relatively large cross-price
response for private labels, such a strategy would be
ineffective. In this instance, examination of the residual
demand elasticity could be a valuable tool to assist pricing
decisions for private label products.
Similar insights can be obtained by examining the
impact of wider private label distribution. Increases in
private label distribution (see the pooled results in Table
1) has the expected effect of increasing (decreasing)
private label (national brand) share. However, higher
private label distribution has the unexpected effect of
increasing national brand price (it has no significant
impact on private label price). A closer examination of the
data over time suggests that a wider distribution of private
label brands appears to push tertiary national brands off
the store shelves, thereby increasing both the share of
private labels and the price difference between private
labels and (the remaining) national brands. However, this
varies significantly by category. For example, while
increased private label distribution has the effect of
increasing national brand price in the pasta category, it has
the effect of decreasing national brand price in the bread
category. This, once again, should not be surprising since
the bread category is characterized by a relatively small
national brand share and small unilateral demand response.
This suggests that increased private label penetration in a
fragmented market may only be achieved through
aggressive pricing, in effect lowering both private label
and national brand price vis-à-vis the intensified price
competition. The pasta category, however is characterized
by a couple of major national manufacturers, a series of
smaller (and lower priced) regional players, and greater
price response on the demand side. Thus, a private label
strategy of increasing distribution by attacking the small
regional players in this category is likely to be effective. It
is also likely to result in higher private label share and a
larger price differential between national brands and
private labels.
The research presented here is not without its
limitations. As mentioned earlier, the use of LA/AIDS
demands requires tradeoffs in deriving the reaction
functions. Future research should examine the implications
of the first order approximation in more detail. Further, as
pointed out by Genesove and Mullin (1998) and by
Cotterill and Putsis (1998), there are a number of
implications of the demand functional form chosen for
vertical channel relationships. This is consistent with
recent theoretical research on channel relationships (LeeCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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and Staelin 1997). Future research should investigate the
vertical implications in more depth. In conclusion, we
encourage future research in this area and, in particular,
research addressing competitive interaction on a category-
by-category basis with the use of disaggregate data.
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Chart 1.  Definitions for Variables Used in the Analysis
(All variables defined for the ith market, jth category)
Dependent Variables
BRSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for branded products
PLSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for private label products
BRPRICE Natural log of the price of the branded product
PLPRICE Natural log of the price of the private label product
Demand Shift Variables (Eij and Dij)
EXPENDITURE Natural log of per capita category expenditures deflated by Stone’s price index
BRDISPLAY Percent of branded products sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion
PLDISPLAY Percent of private label products sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion
BRFEATURE Percent of branded products sold with feature advertising
PLFEATURE Percent of private label products sold with feature advertising
BRPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, branded products
PLPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, private label products
INCOME Natural log of the average household income in the local market
AGE Natural log of the average age of the local market population
PLDISTN Private label average distribution (percent of the market’s All Commodity Volume (ACV) represented by
stores offering a private label in this category).





BRVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for the national brand
PLVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for private label
GROCCR4 Percentage of all grocery sales by the top four grocery chains
HERFINDAHL Herfindahl index of brand concentration in the ith market, jth categoryCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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Table 1.  Estimation Results for Pooled Data: LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Demand Equations Price Reaction Equations
Branded Share Private Label Share Branded Price Private Label Price
BR Price -0.008    (-2.17)* 0.008    (2.17)* 0.077    (8.55)**
PL Price 0.009    (2.74)** -0.009    (-2.74)** 0.075    (15.05)**
BR Price Reduction -0.106    (-6.34)**
PL Price Reduction -0.222    (-12.46)**
BR Volume/Unit -0.870    (-153.8)**
PL Volume/Unit -0.909    (-128.8)**
HHI -0.002    (-0.21) -0.049    (-2.95)**
Grocery CR4 0.028    (2.14)* 0.057    (3.11)**
Expenditure 0.054    (15.68)** -0.054    (-15.68)** 0.229    (38.13)** 0.131    (15.43)**
Br Feature 0.113    (6.49)**    -0.113    (-6.49)** -0.238    (-8.06)** -0.015    (-0.36)
Br Display 0.158    (13.38)** -0.158    (-13.38)** -0.448    (-22.60)** -0.046    (-1.58)
PL Feature -0.024    (-2.28)* 0.024    (2.28)* 0.010    (0.58) -0.173    (-6.69)**
PL Display -0.087    (-12.51)** 0.087    (12.51)** -0.006    (-0.53) -0.268    (-15.84)**
PL Distribution -0.188    (-36.24)** 0.188    (36.24)** 0.047    (5.35) -0.020    (-1.56)
Income 0.021    (3.32)** -0.021    (-3.31)** 0.113    (10.32)** 0.040    (2.54)*
Age -0.014    (-0.979) 0.014    (0.979) -0.161    (-6.45)** -0.094    (-2.67)**
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
Number of Observations = 6717
t(-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% level
Table 2. Estimated Demand Elasticities for Pooled Data: 
                 LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Branded  Private Label
Quantity Quantity
BR Price -1.065 0.225
     (-173.52)**      (10.62)**
PL Price -0.0046 -0.984
 (-1.078)      (-67.06)**
Expenditure 1.070 0.758
     (239.00)**     (48.99)**
BR Feature 0.009 -0.031
    (6.49)**     (-6.49)**
BR Display 0.023 -0.078
    (13.38)**     (-13.38)**
PL Feature -0.002 0.006
 (-2.28)*     (2.28)**
PL Display -0.013 0.045
     (-12.51)**     (12.51)**
PL Distribution -0.190 0.656
    (-36.24)**     (36.24)**
Income    0.699e-06 -0.241e-05
    (3.32)**   (3.32)**
Age -0.0005 0.002
 (-0.978) (0.978)
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
t-statistics in parentheses
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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Table 3.  Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Subsets Sorted by Private Label Share: LA/AIDS Model (First Difference)
Quartile Low Mid Low Mid High High
(Private Label Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Market Share)  (0 – 11.1%)    (11.2 - 23.1%) (23.2 - 39.9%) (> 39.9%)
BR Own Price -1.034 -1.049 -1.110 -1.154
Elasticity      (-201.0)**     (-145.7)**      (-84.05)**     (-35.72)**
PL Own Price -0.983 -0.837 -1.081 -1.156
Elasticity       (-19.22)**     (-20.18)**       (-22.77)**      (-19.84)**
BR Demand Cross -0.001 -0.023 0.025 0.147
Price Elasticity (-0.328)     (-3.93)** (1.70)     (2.68)**
PL Demand Cross 0.676 0.341 0.351 0.163
Price Elasticity    (6.51)**     (6.80)**     (8.25)**     (4.76)**
BR Price Reaction 0.070 0.092 0.068 0.195
Elasticity    (9.10)**     (8.93)**     (4.03)**     (6.48)**
PL Price Reaction 0.172 0.047 0.048 0.113
Elasticity    (7.24)**     (3.17)**     (2.91)**     (6.33)**
NOBS 1680 1679 1681 1678
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
(t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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Table 4. Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Individual Product Categories: LA/AIDS Model
Milk Butter Bread Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
BR Own Price -2.05 -1.50 -1.31 -1.46 -1.39 -1.03
Elasticity     (-4.45)**     (-2.89)**     (-6.73)**      (-14.53)**     (-14.43)**    (-58.42)**
PL Own Price -0.942 -2.49 -0.795 -3.66 -6.38 -0.374
Elasticity   (-2.44)*     (-3.95)**    (-2.02)*     (-3.96)**     (-6.24)**  (-1.45)
BR Cross Price -0.120 1.07 -0.072 0.419 0.525 -0.030
Elasticity  (-0.152)      (2.37)**  (-0.520)     (2.88)**      (5.26)**      (-2.42)**
PL Cross Price 0.510 0.700  0.624 2.94 3.96 0.569
Elasticity     (2.28)** (0.968)   (2.11)*     (4.60)**    (4.02)**   (1.56)
BR Price Reaction 0.125 0.415 0.093  0.517 1.50 0.106
Elasticity (0.846)      (3.02)** (0.722)   (2.11)*  (2.11)*    (2.19)*
PL Price Reaction 0.208 0.497 0.187 0.218 0.893 0.088
Elasticity   (2.30)* (1.39) (0.926)  (0.776)     (2.94)** (0.829)
Average BR Share .30 .54 .62 .81 .84 .94
# Observations 116 112 118 118 118 108
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
(t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% level
Table 5. Unilateral and Residual Demand Elasticities for Individual Product Categories, LA/AIDS Model
Milk Butter Bread Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
BR Unilateral -2.05 -1.50 -1.31 -1.46 -1.39 -1.03
Elasticity (-4.45)** (-2.89)** (-6.73)** (-14.53)** (-14.43) (-58.42)  
BR Residual  -2.07 -0.971 -1.32 -1.37 -0.917 -1.03
Elasticity     (-4.97)**    (-1.99)* (-7.12)**     (-9.61)**     (-6.35)**     (-62.97)**
PL Unilateral  -0.942 -2.49 -0.795 -3.66 -6.38 -0.374
Elasticity (-2.44)* (-3.95)** (-2.02)* (-3.96)** (-6.24)** (-1.45)
PL Residual -0.878 -2.20 -0.737 -2.14 -0.438 -0.314
Elasticity (-2.45)* (-5.04)** (-2.04)* (-2.91)** (-8.07)**  (-1.30)
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label
(t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelCompetitive Interaction Between Private Label and National Brands Cotterill, Putsis, Dhar
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 Appendix – Selected Key Variables and Expected Results
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Variable (Equation) Expected Effect/Rationale
H1: BRPRICE, PLPRICE Standard economic theory predicts negative own-price
(Demand) elasticities and positive cross-price elasticities for substitute goods.  Further,
effects should be asymmetric (Tellis 1988; Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989,
Allenby and Rossi 1991).
H2: BRDISPLAY, PLDISPLAY, Increased own promotions have a positive impact on own
BRFEATURE, PLFEATURE,  sales, and a negative impact on rival’s sales (Blattberg
BRPRICEREDN, PLPRICEREDN and Neslin 1990).
(Demand)
H3: INCOME As per capita income in a market increases, we expect that
(Demand) branded share increases and private label share decreases (Hoch and Banerji
1993).
H4: PLDISTN As more supermarkets in a local market carry private
(Demand, labels, the share and price of national brands decrease (due
   Price) to the increased competition), while the share and price of
private labels increase due to the increased availability of
private label products and the increase in competition.
H5: BRPRICE, PLPRICE The slope of the price reaction curves are positive
(Price) (Deneckere and Davidson 1985).
H6: BRVOLPUN, PLVOLPUN Increasing average package size lowers cost, thereby
(Price) lowering market price.
H7: GROCCR4 Increases in grocery firm local market concentration
(Price) increase prices due to higher margins resulting from increased market power at
the retail level (Marion 1979, Cotterill 1986).
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